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On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules
J. K, SEADE*
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, England

Abstracts
Take consumers to be described by a parameter h (skill, needs, etc.) with utilities defined on N commodities,
including factor supplies. Our main result is that if in the optimum each component of this consumption vector
is bounded and bounded away from zero over the population, each marginal tax must be zero at both ends of the
corresponding tax schedule. For the income tax case, it is also shown that if the marginal tax rate at the top of the
scale is positive, one can construct another tax schedule which is strongly Pareto superior (dominating the first
one at all or most income levels), requirements of information being low.

1. Introduction
An old question in the normative theory of taxation is how best to decide on the trade-off
between efficiency and equality. Pigou (1946) stressed that since the (social) marginal utility of
income decreases with income, any transfer of purchasing power from rich to poor which does not
decrease aggregate output is socially desirable. However, if we can only achieve this redistribution
through taxation (and assuming away undistorting, once-and-for-all reallocations of property), it
becomes central to consider to what extent the supply of efforts, and hence output, would be
affected if a given redistributive tax-scheme were imposed.1 Specifically, we want to find a way to
take this efficiency-effect into account when selecting the progressivity of tax schedules. This is
the central feature of the theory of optimal income taxation, originated by Mirrlees (1971), to
incorporate the analysis of the different supplies of labour brought about by alternative tax
schedules into a welfare maximization formulation.
The immediate aim when setting up an optimization exercise of this sort, apart from the basic
one of providing a rigorous and workable formulation of the problem, clearly is to characterize an
optimum fully by means of necessary conditions that it must satisfy. These conditions, however,
are not of so much interest in themselves, but rather as a source of more specific knowledge of the
qualitative nature and quantitative features of optimal taxes. By and large, the dominant line of
approach to this problem has been the numerical analysis of solutions for various specific examples.
Much is already known, for instance, on the way the general level of taxes depends on the
specification of the model, notably that optimal marginal taxes are surprisingly low in many cases,
but that they tend to increase: (i) the more pre-tax inequality there is [Mirrlees (1971)], (ii) the more
inequality-averse the government is [Atkinson (1973)] and, notably, (iii) the less a typical
consumer's supply of labour reacts to small (and compensated) changes in his marginal tax rate - a
result reminiscent of the Pigovian claim mentioned above [Feldstein (1973), Stern (1976)]. Another,
perhaps less intuitive feature of solutions, relates to the shape of tax schedules: does the analysis
of optimal taxation provide support for the general presumption that the taxation of income should
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be progressive 2 throughout? Surprisingly, numerical examples in most cases give a negative
answer to this question, with optimal income tax schedules typically being progressive at low levels
of income and then regressive from a certain point onwards.3 The incidence of this feature invites
an intuitive or a formal explanation.
In contrast to this relatively large amount of mainly numerical research, few analytical results
have been found (except for particular cases), which is to say that in fact not much is known of the
qualitative nature of optimal income taxes in the general case. I would say there are only two results
in this direction: that optimal marginal income taxes always lie between zero and one [Mirrlees
(1971, propositions 2 and 3)]4 and that the marginal tax at the top of a bounded optimal income tax
schedule must be zero5 - providing a firm rejection of uniform progressivity of optimal taxes (for
bounded incomes). It is in more general results of this type that I am interested here. Important
though this result is, if only because it casts some doubt on the desirability of tax schedules
observed in practice, it however provides no hint as to how the rest of the tax schedule ought to be.
In particular, it is not unlikely that it be precisely the tax treatment of the bottom fractions of the
population, not of those at the top, that has more bearing on welfare, both because there usually are
more people near the bottom than near the top of the scale of incomes and because each one of
them has a higher welfare weight. It is therefore of particular interest to try to arrive at tax rules of
the same degree of generality for the bottom end of the income tax. Since a zero marginal tax at
the top implies regressivity near the top, should we then have uniform regressivity in some cases?
Do we want high or low marginal taxes near the bottom?
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the zero marginal tax is a quite general property
of both endpoints of optimal nonlinear taxes (i.e. those whose marginal rate of taxation is not
restricted to constancy), such as taxes on income, expenditure or wealth. Specifically, in the
particular case of the income tax. we find that the zero-marginal-tax result we know for the top of
the scale also holds at the bottom, as long as the economy has no zero-income households in the
optimal arrangement. More generally, marginal taxes at both ends of any optimal nonlinear tax
schedule are zero, the general requirement being that the consumption vector to which the tax gives
rise (including the amount of work done and hence gross income) be bounded above and away
from zero across the population in the optimum, a not unlikely condition when we are dealing with
aggregates such as income, total consumption or expenditure in each period of a man's life. This
result is presented in section 5 in this fairly general form, applying to unspecified nonlinear taxes
or tax mixes. The model required is formulated in section 4 and the discussion of the result is
concentrated, mainly, in section 6.

2

Two distinct concepts of progressivity of a tax are commonly met, corresponding to increases of average or of
marginal tax payments with income. The former corresponds more closely with the intuitive idea of 'progressivity'
as a measure of how redistributive the tax is, but the two concepts clearly are closely interwound. I here take
progressivity in the marginal tax sense, although the implications of our remarks and results for the shape of average
taxes can easily be worked out. 'Regressivity' is similarly defined, as the converse of progressivity.
3
Two main exceptions to this general shape have been noticed: one is that with a Pareto distribution of skills [for
which Mirrlees (1971) found rather high asymptotic marginal taxes] and in the maximin case (presumably in more
general cases too) the optimal marginal tax rate is monotonically increasing [Atkinson (1972)). This is related to the
discussion In footnote 30 (below) and the text preceding it. Another exception, easier to rationalize, is when the
supply of labour is positively sloped at all high levels of (net) income [Mirrlees (1971, case (i) on p. 15)], in which
case not much money needs to be left to the rich from their marginal earnings to have them always working more
the more able they are, thus making optimal marginal tax rates tend asymptotically to one, so as to exploit these rich
revenue (or redistributive) possibilities.
4
Mirrlees also found that in the optimum arrangement there normally is a fraction of the population (all those below a
certain ability level) who remain idle, but this result needs to be qualified (section 3, below).
5
See Phelps (1973) for the maximin criterion and Sadka (1976) for the utilitarian case. The 'top' of a tax curve is taken
to be at the highest level of income actually observed in the population, although the tax schedule may of course be
defined for all levels of income.
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But before we go on to the main sections, it will be convenient to consider in particular some
aspects of the income tax case. In section 2 (and the appendix) we revise the familiar zero-marginaltax result for the top-end of income taxes with the purpose of extending it in directions not covered
by the otherwise more general formulation of later sections, also presenting a way to improve on
existing suboptimal income taxes that has some practical appeal, and in section 3 we discuss and
qualify the well-known result that there should be a number of people not doing any work in the
optimal tax regime, which has direct bearing on whether the marginal tax at the bottom of the
income scales should be zero or not.
2. The zero marginal income tax at the top
2.1. A necessary condition for optimality
The examples studied by Mirrlees and Atkinson had populations with unbounded individual
income (or wage rates, more precisely), that is, with upper tails of incomes extending indefinitely
to the right, which is a feature of most density functions commonly used. Although in these
examples the marginal tax rate did not always tend to zero, it did often show a tendency to decline
in some cases in fact towards zero. One may conjecture that the force behind this asymptotic
behaviour of the tax rate is revealed by the bounded income tax case, e. that in which we assume
that no one in the population has a wage rate higher than a certain level, for in this case a clear-cut
result is available, that the marginal tax should be zero at the top of the scale [Phelps (1973), Sadka
(1976)]. The intuitive explanation of this result is immediate in the utilitarian case: suppose we
have any given tax schedule whose marginal tax at the top is cot zero but positive.6 Allow then the
top man to earn tax free any excess of income he had previously decided not to make the effort to
earn, partly because he would have been paying tax on it. In taking advantage of the change he
ends up better off, working (and consuming) more and paying no less tax than before. The same is
true of any other people who may decide to work harder so as to take advantage of the new taxfree range at the top. Hence the change is good and is revenue-feasible.7
Geometrically (see fig. 1), denote by ≡
and ≡
the consumption and hours worked
by a man whose wage rate is w and whose income is ≡
. We assume perfect
substitutability in production between labour of different grades, l hour of a w-man being identical
to w hours of a 1-man. Let θ, drawn in the diagram as Aθ, be the net-income function imposed by
the government and from which each person must make a choice. (θ will be used both as a label to
denote a particular net income curve and as the corresponding functional relation.) We assume that
all consumers have the same indifference curves (not shown) between consumption c and hours
worked l, from which we can draw their indifference curves between c and wl, i.e. between net
income (≡ consumption) and gross income. These curves are obtained simply by expanding or
contracting horizontally each (c, l)-curve by a factor w.8 Now suppose that at the point a selected
by the top man, the marginal tax rate is positive, i.e. ′
1 at that point (because net income is
1
′. It is then clear that cannot
related to tax payments
by
, hence
be optimal, at least as long as one attaches positive weights to the utilities of the highest earners,
because if we replace the segment
by any steeper one such as
(which is a zero-marginal-tax
line), the top man moves to some point a* where he is better off; it is not hard to see that there will
normally be other men (those close enough in ability to the top man, if there are any) deciding now
6

The above-mentioned result by Mirrlees (1971) that no marginal taxes can be negative in the optimum is central to
the argument.
7
I partially followed Stern's (1976) way of putting the result verbally.
8
Hence each w has a different map of indifference curves (c, y), reflecting the different amounts of work different
people would have to do to earn a given pre-tax income. If (but not only if) c is noninferior these curves are at each
point strictly flatter (lower | MRScy)) the larger w is, implying that income is non-decreasing in the wage rate and
strictly increasing if (or wherever) the tax schedule is smooth.
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to work harder so as to earn income in the stretch aa* who will be better off as well and, finally,
the change is feasible, for all these movements are along lines with slope less than (or equal to)
one, i.e. with each consumer whose behaviour is affected by the tax change increasing his gross
income by more than (or as much as) his consumption, therefore not decreasing his tax payments,
Meanwhile, the rest of the population remain earning, consuming and paying taxes in the same
amounts as before the tax change. Hence the well- known result that θ cannot be optimal.
It is worth noting at this point an immediate yet interesting generalization of this result: although
the theory of optimal taxation becomes considerably more complicated once we allow for people
to differ in more than one respect [see Mirrlees (1976), Seade (1977)], e.g. wage rate and work
preferences, it still is a necessary condition for an optimum that the marginal tax faced by the
highest earner should be zero. In the simple model with identical preferences, all consumers earning
the same level of income also have the same wage rate (apart from possible corners of θ) and hence
all the indifference curves tangent to θ at each point are equal. When preferences vary in
unspecified ways across consumers, this will not be the case any more; some people will be earning
a given income because they are more able, while others because they are more hard-working, say.
Similarly, the top-income man will now not necessarily be the one with the highest wage rate (or
natural skill, rather, for we can allow for strength of efforts to be a choice variable, which of course
affects the wage rate). But all this does not really affect our conclusions here, because it is still true
that if we replace the segment
in fig. 1 by , the new net income schedule will cut the initiallyoptimal indifference curves of some people at or near the top, allowing them to move towards
higher levels of preference.9 Anyone who for this reason decides to work more (or harder) will be
better off and will be paying no less tax than before. Thus, the optimal income-tax schedule must
have a zero marginal tax at the top, even when the preference structures underlying the workbehaviour of different consumers differ in any number of ways.

Notice that the result imposes regressivity of optimal income taxes near the top, bat perhaps very
locally : nothing is implied on whether the tax schedule as a whole should be very redistributive or
not. Nevertheless, it suffices to establish not only suboptimality but indeed Pareto-inefficiency of
income taxes with a positive marginal tax at the top. As an analytical proposition it is fairly strong.
9

Certainly all those near enough the top and with smooth indifference curves (although smoothness is not really
necessary) and certainly no one with Leontief-type indifference curves, who would prefer to stay where they were.
The final ordering of incomes will now normally change, unlike the simple case.
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However, one would like to go beyond that and seek some applicable policy implications from the
analysis, and in this direction this simple tax reform does not seem to have much appeal, as it
improves matters by raising the well-being of a very small group of people who are, moreover,
those at the very top. True， the change will probably yield some extra revenue which can be
reallocated somewhere else in the economy for the benefit of others. However, the first-order utility
benefit to the rich will yield a second-order extra amount of revenue and hence a second order
welfare benefit to the rest of the population. This is dearly illustrated taking the extreme case of a
discrete population distributed near the top in such a way that it does not pay the second man to
move onto the tax-free segment aa*, in which case the only beneficiary of the change is the top
man, who pays no extra revenue at all.
We can alternatively devise a tax reform at the top specifically aimed at increasing the tax
payments by the direct beneficiaries of the tax change, including the top man: instead of reducing
the marginal tax immediately to zero at the level of income the top man initially had, we can reduce
it first by a lesser amount and only at some higher point perhaps make it zero, so that the new tax
schedule is one that lies somewhere between θ and in fig. 1. Under such a scheme it is easy to
show that the tax payments by anyone who decides to take advantage of the tax change by working
more are always higher than under the tax schedule Aa but that,in exchange, there are fewer such
people (this can easily be checked drawing in fig. 1 the relevant indifference curve of the man who
is just indifferent between moving onto or staying where he was on θ, who definitely prefers to
stay on θ if faced with a tax change at the top that lies strictly below ). The extreme case is when
the new tax schedule leaves the top man at point b (fig. 1) on his initial indifference curve, so that
as much revenue as possible is being exacted from him (within the class of Pare to-improved
schedules). In this case the relative orders of magnitude of the top man’s utility gains and taxpayments changes have been completely reversed from what they were in the simple tax change of
fig. 1, but now no one in the economy other than the top man reacts to the tax change at all.
2.2. Nonlocal Pareto-improvements
The tax reform outlined in fig. 1 and its variants just mentioned have the common feature that
they leave the current tax schedule up to its current top- point basically unchanged, introducing
certain desirable changes only from that point onwards (and, indirectly, shifting the whole tax
schedule slightly upwards, if the increased revenue is redistributed as a poll sum). The result of this
is that whether we want to increase the utilities of the very rich or their tax payments, we are in any
case relying only on the reactions of that group to improved incentives. In this sense the result is a
very local one, which reduces its practical appeal. 10 It would be of more interest to find an
improvement on a given inefficient tax schedule such that, on the one hand, the benefit is shared
by the population at large and, on the other, the source of this benefit is not a local change of
behaviour but one of the population at large too, a feasible upwards shift of all of θ. Let us state
the following result that says that this is possible, proceeding then to prove it by constructing the
required variation of θ. I return to the standard assumption of equal indifference maps between
consumption and hours worked for all consumers. I also assume consumption is not inferior , so
that income is nondecreasing in the wage rate (see footnote 8) and, only for simplicity, that the netincome function θ has no comers.
Theorem 1. Let income be bounded in the population. Then any income-tax schedule with a
positive marginal tax at the top of the scale can be replaced by another one that leaves all
10

It also presents some practical difficulties: if the increased revenue collected at the top is to be distributed elsewhere
in the scale, say as a poll grant, the diagrammatic neatness of the analysis is lost, first because so as to know how
much revenue is collected at the top and hence how big the poll transfer can be, one needs to know the distribution
of skills in the population; and second, because recipients of the increased poll grant will themselves adjust (normally
reduce) their supply of labour and hence their tax payments, thus requiring a more elaborate analysis.
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consumers better off (or all those with positive incomes and above the highest level at which the
marginal tax is zero, if the original schedule has '(y) = 0 anywhere), inducing them to earn more
income while paying the same amount of tax as before.
Hence the original tax schedule is strongly Pareto-inferior and of course suboptimal.
To prove this, let θ in fig. 2 be the initial net consumption curve, to which a tax schedule
is uniquely associated. We draw indifference curves for each w (constructed from the unique
map on (c, l ) and the different values of w) which, when tangent to θ, show the gross-income-netincome point a w-man selects, just as before. Notice that any movement of a person’s income and
consumption along the 45° line on which he is initially located represents equal total tax payments,
that is, such movements are feasible from the point of view of budget balance. Equivalently,
assuming labour is paid its marginal product, these movements are also feasible from the point of
view of total output, since along these lines each consumer’s consumption and output (i.e. income)
change by the same amounts.11 Consider now the indifference curves of a w-man, who facing the
net income schedule θ chooses to earn income and consume at point P in the figure. Let us assume
that the marginal tax he faces is positive (see footnote 6), i.e. that the slope of θ and hence the slope
of his indifference curve through P are less than one. It is clear that if this man were allowed to
choose his most preferred position on the 45° line that passes through P he would choose a point
of more income (and work), i.e. one that lies northeast of P, say point Q.12 Denote the locus of
these points for different people by L, which we shall use as a mere line of reference. (Notice,
however, that this line gives the full Pareto optimum associated to the prevailing allocation of tax
burdens, if these were fixed as lump-sum transfers (w) and each consumer were allowed to move
along ‘his’ 45° line, without facing any distortion.) It is easy to see that, as long as ′ ≦ 1, L lies
northeast of θ and that if there is a point at which ′ 1 (i.e. zero marginal tax), θ and L must there
coincide. If ′ 1 at the top, there must be a gap between θ and L at the top, given by the distance
between the points a and a*.
Our new net income schedule , improving the prevailing one θ, is now constructed as follows:
we select a point such as between a and a* and we induce the top man to ‘stay’ at by giving
the slope of his indifference curve through that point. We follow this direction towards the left, at
each point giving the slope of the indifference curve through that point of the man who, under θ,
consumes on the same 45° line. Hence each and every consumer moves northeast along 45° lines
and therefore is feasible from the point of view of revenue (or of total output); by construction
of the allocation it implies is indeed chosen by consumers so that it is feasible from the point of
view of decentralization of consumption decisions too and, finally, is clearly better than θ for
each consumer. Hence the theorem.
A point that needs to be checked to validate the above argument is whether must is fact lie
everywhere strictly above θ and does not cross it or merge with it. That cannot cross θ is
immediate, because if there were a point of contact between the two curves, would by

11

We are assuming, as was implicitly required also in the tax change of fig. 1 constant returns to scale, so that wages
do not change with the labour supply. The assumption is removed below.
12
If consumers' preferences were such that zero leisure could be observed at certain (positive) prices, the point Q could
correspond to a corner-solution, which I exclude as an uninteresting (but easy to deal with) complication.
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construction coincide with θ from that point downwards. Hence the change is Paretian, no one is
made worse off. On the other hand, it is shown in the appendix that as long as marginal taxes are
strictly positive at every point of θ, lies strictly above θ, so that it in fact leaves everybody better
off. However, if at some point θ has a zero marginal tax, it is obvious that θ, L and therefore also
must merge together at the highest such point, and θ obviously coinciding from that point
downwards. Such a point would be a singularity for the family of variations we are considering,
and this imposes the main part of the qualification of the scope of the theorem written in brackets
in its statement. Similarly, if under θ there are a number of people not doing any work, then we
must build with a zero-marginal-tax range along the 45° line passing through the bottom (y = 0)
of θ, so that anyone of the previously idle who now (under ) decides to work pays, just as everyone
else, the same amount of tax as before. But some of this group may still choose not to work under
, thus ending up in the same position they were under θ. Hence the restriction to positive incomes
in the theorem.
The assumption of constant returns to scale has thus far been needed so as to leave the level and
distribution of wages fixed while changing the aggregate supply of labour. It is easy to drop this
assumption without causing any harm to the results - only to the simplicity in computing a given
. For this purpose, we reinterpret w as being the nominal wage rate (relative to the wage rate of
a reference man), which is given exogenously by the distribution of skills. Real wages are now
,
where is the basic real wage rate (per efficiency unit);
≡
is now nominal income.
Indifference curves between (real) consumption and nominal income can still be drawn in the
diagram and are invariant to changes in . The only change that would need to be introduced in
fig. 2 is that the technical transformation of changes in nominal income into equal changes in
consumption is now not performed along straight lines of fixed, unitary slope. Instead, we first
consider infinitesimal shifts of θ,13 for which the slope of the transformation lines is the wage rate
13

It is easy to see that no two ’s can cross each other and that this implies that we can find one everywhere arbitrarily
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prevailing then, under θ. Call it
. For larger (finite) changes, we have that the further our
choice of is from θ, the more the associated basic wage rate
falls (if decreasing returns
prevail). Therefore, the lines that transform changes in efficiency units into equal changes in output
(i.e. nominal income into consumption) are now not straight lines but certain concave curves, all
at the points they cross the member
of the family of curves we have
having a slope
defined. Now, for purposes of computation, to find a particular curve that represents a finite
improvement on the initial net income schedule, all that is involved is the calculation of a
. At each step we know the
succession of such ’s along these concave curves with slope
, which was found in the previous step (starting the series with the
prevailing basic wage rate
and the associated aggregate
wage rate actually ruling under θ), and which we use to compute
an input for the next computation. 14 It is in any case
supply of labour, which yields
unlikely that as a result of the tax changes we are describing the labour supply should change
enough to introduce serious nonlinearities in the system - perhaps the assumption of constant
returns or an approximation with a small number of linear steps will be reasonably accurate, all the
more so from a long-run point of view, where the stock of capital is allowed to adjust to changes
in the labour supply. In fact, Flemming (1976) shows that, under certain conditions, purely
redistributive earned income taxes do not affect the steady- state basic wage rate at all.
The tax schedules so constructed (whether with a constant or with a falling basic wage rate),
form a one-parameter family of nonintersecting curves, each one of them Pareto-superior to all
those below it. The parameter that defines them is simply the choice of the starting point , between
a and a*. On each of these curves each consumer pays the same total amount of taxes as under θ,
while earning higher incomes. The incentive for this expansion is provided by a suitably selected
general decrease in marginal tax rates 15 while keeping the basic poll transfer unchanged. The
necessary and sufficient condition for us to be able to construct the exercise is that there initially
be a positive marginal tax rate at the top.
Clearly, from among the curves in this family, the best one is that which starts precisely at a*,
i.e. the one with a zero marginal tax at the top.16 Let us denote it by θ*. Presumably the government
chose to impose the currently ruling tax schedule simply because it is one that it likes for some
reason. If so, and if the government is Paretian, then there is something to be said for θ*, a tax
reform that leaves the structure of tax payments essentially unchanged while allowing a strong
Pareto improvement to take place. On the other hand, the government might in some cases be
reluctant to impose a true (utilitarian) optimal tax schedule even if in principle it believed in it,
particularly if it were very different from the taxes ruling at the time. For example, institutional (or
other) barriers may still impede the implementation of a negative income tax. The second best may
not be practicable but maybe ‘the third’ is, θ*, which should not be so difficult to introduce as it
works to everyone’s advantage. Finally, a convenient feature of this tax reform is that, for purposes
of actual computation, we do not need to investigate the underlying distribution of skills - perhaps
the ingredient of optimal income taxes which is the hardest one to obtain - nor do we require
specification of a welfare function (one is ‘sanctifying’ the current choices of the government and

14

15

16

close to θ.
In the foregoing, I have restricted attention to the direct interrelation between tax changes, changes in the supply of
labour and the wage rate. However, when the supply of labour increases and there are diminishing returns, there is
a corresponding increase in the level of profits, which means (i) that profits-recipients will benefit more than what
our analysis would indicate, and (ii) that they will therefore revise (probably reduce) their supply of labour. Of
course all this will not happen if all extra profits are taxed away and destroyed, say, so that our picture gives a valid
distribution of minimum benefits. I thank D. Soskice for calling my attention to the presence of profits in this case.
It is in fact a general decrease in the marginal tax rates faced by different people if, as we normally expect,
indifference curves for each w become steeper as we move northeast along the relevant 45° line, in going from θ to
. A sufficient condition for this to hold (below the line L) is noninferiority of leisure
This curve also maximizes aggregate output relative to the family defined by θ. Note that points a* in figs. 1 and 2
are but the same.
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simply improving on them). Only knowledge of the work-behaviour of consumers (or of ‘typical’
consumers) remains necessary - and the tax schedule one is to start from. An appendix gives the
differential equation form of this tax reform.
3. The bottom end of income taxes: Should some people be induced not to work?
It is tempting to apply similar arguments to the analysis of the bottom end of the scale, particularly
because it may in a relevant sense be ‘more important’ to have clear ideas about how we want to
treat people in low income brackets. However, one soon realizes that the type of direct arguments
used so far does not work at the bottom of the scale. Intuitively, the difficulty lies in that, other
things being equal, reductions in marginal tax rates from any point downwards in the scale represent
increases in tax payments by the people affected (from B0 to B1 in fig. 3) and is therefore not a good
change for them, whereas reductions in marginal tax rates from any point upwards represent
reductions in tax payments by those affected (from T0 to T1) and hence is an unambiguous
improvement if feasible.

When unable to use direct arguments to prove optimality or suboptimality of a candidate tax
function, one must resort to the analysis of necessary conditions for an optimum, on the assumption
that it exists. It will be shown in the following sections that this approach is particularly fruitful in
the present context, for it yields a fairly general result (on the marginal taxes required at the
endpoints of any nonlinear tax schedule) which in particular says that the property of the top of
income taxes discussed in the last section applies to the bottom as well: if no household earns zero
income in the optimal arrangement, then the optimal marginal tax faced by the lowest earner is
zero. The condition at the top was boundedness of income; the condition at the bottom is the
symmetrical one: boundedness away from zero (in the optimum). In fact, it will be suggested in
section 6 that in many cases all one needs for the result to hold at the bottom of the scale is that
income be positive for all consumers whose wage rate is positive - i.e. we can often allow for the
distribution of income to start off from zero, but we exclude the possibility that there be a number
of people with different wage rates doing no work in the optimum. This requirement will probably
be surprising to all those familiar with the optimal income tax literature and with the well-known
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result on the desirability of having ‘bunching’ of able people remaining idle at the bottom of the
optimal income scale, a result which we now turn to discuss.
Consider an indifference curve between consumption and hours worked, which on the assumption
of identical preferences is the same for everybody in the population, panel (a) of fig. 4, and consider
the resulting map in consumption-income space shown in panel (b), obtained by multiplying each

value of l in panel (a) by w. That is, in going from (a) to (b), one is stretching or compressing
horizontally all indifference curves by a factor w. It is immediate that if the marginal rate of
substitution of c for l at l = 0 is strictly positive, as shown in fig. 4a, the resulting indifference
curves in panel (b) must have a slope at each y (including y = 0) that increases without bound as w
→ 0. The result of this is that when any net income function is drawn on the diagram, there always
is a positive wage rate below which everybody chooses not to work, as long as θ'(y) ≦ 1 for all y,
a prerequisite for optimality. This is shown in fig. 4c. Therefore, with preferences being as in fig.
4a, ‘bunching’ at the bottom must arise whenever the distribution of wages goes down to zero (and
is continuous, or ‘nearly’ so, near the bottom), provided we restrict attention to nonnegative
marginal tax functions.
The above result was noticed by Mirrlees (1971, p. 185) who, however, was implicitly making an
assumption (see footnote 19, below) on individual preferences: that even when no work is
performed (l = 0), individuals have a strict marginal dislike for work, and so behave as if they
would like to work even less, so to speak (the standard corner solution) - which is the case portrayed
in panel (a) of fig. 4. But the diametrically opposite result can be arrived at by making what might
appear to be a minor change in our description of the work-behaviour of ‘typical’ consumers. We
may assume that people indeed always prefer having more rather than less leisure time, but that
they are satisfied on that count (satiated of leisure) when they do no amount of work whatever, by
which I mean that their marginal rate of substitution of c for l is zero at l = 0. Indifference curves
would then meet the c-axis at right angles, as in panel (a) of fig. 5.17 But then, when curves like
this one are stretched or compressed to obtain the maps on (c, y)-space of fig. 5b, it is clear that
they retain their zero slope at y = 0. It then follows that any tax function will induce everybody
(except people with w = 0)18 to do some work, provided only that the marginal tax rate at the bottom
does not reach 100% (θ'(0) = 0). Wo can notice in passing that although a net income function
with θ'(0) = 0 would probably be suboptimal in most interesting cases (for the extreme
disincentive to work it imposes on the bottom fractions of the labour force), it nevertheless is
precisely a feature of tax schedules commonly observed in practice (with unemployment benefits
which are lost if any income is earned), so that it is just natural to expect some bunching at the
bottom - induced unemployment - in actual economies, regardless of the type of work preferences
that prevail.

17
18

Two illustrative examples of utility functions having these indifference curves are given in section 6 (eq. (21))
The diagram only says that
≡
0 at w = 0, but not that in fact l(0) = 0. However, this is obvious,
because a 0-man’s budget constraint in (c, l)-space (i.e. in fig. 5a) is a horizontal straight line.
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We can then distinguish two main cases:19
Proposition 1. (i) ‘Bunching’: if the marginal rate of substitution of consumption c for time worked
0 such that ail
l remains strictly positive as → 0, then there always is a certain number
consumers with ∈ 0,
do not work, provided only that they face nonnegative marginal taxes
(which includes the optimum). (ii) No ‘bunching’: if the marginal rate of substitution of c for l tends
to zero as l→ 0 and if marginal taxes are less than 100% (at least at the bottom of the scale), then
the only people who do not work are those who would not earn any income if they worked.
In either case it is also clear from the figures that if it is optimal for a -man not to work, this is
[Mirrlees (1971, proposition 1)], although under (ii) this set consists
also optimal for all ≦
0.
only of
Which of these two basic types of work preferences is a more reasonable simplification of reality?
The question is simply whether work-behaviour is such that individuals prefer not to earn any
income by their own effort if the wage rate is low enough (but positive), choosing merely to rely
on the basic poll-subsidy paid by the government. An important notion here; is leisure', and what
we take it to represent, i.e. whether it corresponds to the time not spent in production activities,
which is perhaps its more natural definition, or whether it is the time not actually sold in the market
as a service, which is the relevant notion for the fiscal authority interested in taxable incomes.
Because in the second case, leisure includes possible nonmarket production activities, and it is clear
that there may be some individuals whose productivity in these activities is greater than what they
would earn as workers in the market, so that they withdraw their supply of work and become
nonworkers in the eyes of the government. Of course these people will normally be wanting to sell
some of their ‘home’ produce, so as to be able to buy other goods, in which case they are not zeroincome bunchers in the end. Bunching will arise on account of the present argument only if nonmarket production is possible and if, in the face of a given tax schedule, people choosing not to sell
their labour in the market also prefer to keep their home product rather than selling part of it.
Needless to say, this story does not fit the simplified economy modelled above, for we are here
referring to different types of production activities, in some of which incomes are not taxable at the
production point (but only if sales are realized). Our interest is simply to seek a rationalization for
or against the possibility of zero-income bunching on these lines.

19

It may be convenient to put briefly the foregoing in symbols. Let the utility function be
,
, /
. Define
the marginal rate of substitution of c for l (panels (a)) as — / (with a minus sign to make it normally positive)
and that of c for y (panels (b)) as — /
.

11

This is the typesetting manuscript of an article. The final published version is available at
Journal of Public Economics 7:2, pp. 203-235 (April 1977); doi:10.1016/0047-2727(77)90046-9
ISSN 0047-2727 (Print) Copyright © North-Holland Publishing Company

w → 0, - ut0/wuc0
Write u° ≡ u(c°, 0). If - ut0/ uc0 > 0 (for c° > 0, c° ≡ basic poll subsidy) as in fig. 4a, then as
0
→ ∞ > θ'(0) (because the latter is bound to be ≦ 1), and it pays all consumers from some w downwards not to work.
This is the case implicit in Mirrlees (1971) when he says (at the foot of p.185) that unless c0 = 0, ut0/wuc0 is unbounded
as w → 0. Our second case is when - ut0/uc0 = 0, as in fig. 5a, in which case - ut0/wuc0 = 0 for any w > 0, so that if θ'(0)
> 0, it pays all consumers with w > 0 to work.

At another level, we can assume away the existence of any nonmarket production activities, so
that leisure consists only of nonproductive ‘free time’ (i.e. time not enagaged in the production of
marketable goods). It may reasonably be argued that more leisure time not only provides one with
more rest away from work, say, but that it actually enables one to enjoy more one's consumption,
which hints at indifference curves of the first type, as in fig. 4. This argument seems to me
persuasive if the level of basic consumption one has in mind is high (i.e. when one is referring to
indifference curves that meet the c-axis at high ), which is probably not the relevant case in the
present context, where is just the poll subsidy, which cannot be particularly high at any rate. In
our case it seems more likely that the consumer will not have much interest in increasing his leisure
beyond a certain point, but will always try to sell some of his services in the market rather than
being entirely idle all of his time.20 One can pose the question: if there was a perfect labour market
and consumers faced no income taxes but only a moderate fixed poll grant somehow financed, say,
would there be voluntary unemployment? Only a negligible amount, I believe - of course leaving
aside nonparticipation of a proportion of women (as well as of children and the aged), largely due
to noneconomic factors.
4. Optimal nonlinear taxes
We have so far restricted attention to the taxation of (earned) income. More generally, however,
we want to select an optimal tax mix: if say wealth, expenditure or perhaps food taxes are to be
introduced, it is clear that their tax schedules should not optimally be selected in isolation from the
income tax, but as the outcome of a single decision process, recognizing that one tax schedules
redistributive force and its effects on aggregate efficiency compound with those of the other tax
schedule(s) present. The model of this section admits these possibilities, i.e. it can be interpreted
as dealing with any one of the above-mentioned taxes or with a mix of them.21 Our main aim here
is to derive an interesting qualitative statement on the shape of optimal nonlinear tax schedules in
this fairly general setting.
The analysis of the previous section illustrated the delicate relation between assumptions on
preferences and the qualitative nature of the optimum. Indeed, by merely giving a positive tilt to
the bottom end of indifference curves, we went from having all consumers conveniently distributed
along the tax curve, to a situation in which a number of them are necessarily not working, ‘bunching’
at the bottom of the schedule. It is not difficult to see how this lesson extends to either end of other
types of taxes. All we need is to ask whether there is a high enough price in the case of a
consumption good (low enough in the case of work) as to choke off demand completely. The
answer is no if each marginal rate of substitution of the numeraire for a commodity (or service)
tends to infinity (zero) as the consumption of that commodity (or supply of work) tends to zero.
These conditions are, in this sense, equivalent.

20

Moreover, there is no reason why the level of leisure satiation should not occur at a positive level of work done, in
which case (ignored above to avoid overcrowding of diagrams and possibilities) we would of course have again ‘no
bunching’ with the curves of fig. 5 being a particular case.
21
The model is the particular case H = 1 of a more general formulation presented in Seade (1977), where individuals
differ in H dimensions. Mirrlees has also studied the more general problem; see, e.g., (1976)
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The relevance of the above discussion lies in that the result we shall derive below on the shape
of optimal taxes requires, basically, that there should be no bunching of a nonzero proportion of
people (if these are distributed continuously) at an endpoint of the corresponding tax schedule, as
would result if their different maximization problems had a corner solution, so that we restrict
attention to interior optima for consumers (although of course we can allow for corner solutions to
arise at some prices, as long as in the optimum this is not the case). This would certainly be a very
restrictive condition if the tax schedules put into the model were interpreted as referring to specific,
disaggregated commodities, some of which would normally not be consumed at all by a considerable number of people. But in such cases the very setting up of a theory contemplating only
nonlinear tax treatment of the consumption of these commodities is itself open to question, for no
one I think would propose the introduction of nonlinear taxes based on the consumption of
individual goods, whose trading among consumers would be impossible (or very expensive) to
avoid. What I have in mind is to interpret our model and results mainly as applying to major
aggregates which are usually or can conceivably be taxed nonlinearly, such as expenditure at
different periods, income or wealth, the arguments in utility functions being such (e.g. consumption
in certain years) that no corner solutions for individuals can sensibly exist.

4.1. The model
We shall assume that consumers can be fully described by a single parameter h (the wage rate,
an index of needs, preferences of some sort) which follows a distribution function with density f(h),
defined for values of h in a certain interval:
∈

,

. 22

Since by assumption consumers differ only in h, they must otherwise have the same preferences,
which we assume can be captured by a utility function, a particular cardinalization of which is
selected by the government so as to reflect its own (individualistic) preferences:
,

,

(1)

where x = x(h) is the vector of N commodities consumed by h (although later we shall distinguish
a numeraire and still denote by x the remaining commodities). I assume that, for each , ∙, is
a continuous, monotonic, strictly concave and everywhere differentiable function of x(h) and that
preferences (both utilities and marginal utilities) vary continuously with h.
Let us formulate the tax problem in a general way: the government imposes a closed set Θ of
possible after-tax consumption bundles on consumers, from which the latter must make a choice.
∈ ,

Choice Set.

(2)

The relevant part of the frontier of (i.e. its consumption-efficient points) we denote by θ, which
we take to be piecewise differentiable.
The government is interested, we assume, in maximizing the sum of individual utilities:
W≡

,

d ,

Social Welfare.

(3)

There are two complications that need not be introduced explicitly: the first is that in fact the
government may be interested in raising or disposing of a certain revenue. We assume that the
welfare value of this revenue (for the expenditure it may finance, say) enters a more general social
22

I take this interval to be the support of f (), i.e. the smallest (closed) interval containing all the values of h for which
f(h) > 0. When h is interpreted as an ability index, it is most natural to take it to represent the (relative) wage rate,
so that and are fixed and given, but more generally these values are largely arbitrary and any strictly increasing
transform of the index h (onto [0,1] or [0, ∞>], say) could be used.
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welfare function in a weakly separable fashion, so that the government is still interested in
maximizing (3) over the possible allocations x(h). The second is that, seemingly, we should allow
, or more generally
, , to
for any strictly quasi-concave transformation of utilities
appear in the maximand (3), so as to reflect different possible attitudes towards inequality on the
part of the government. However, this is an uninteresting way of complicating our notation, for the
particular cardinalization ∙, ∙ was itself picked by the government so as to reflect exactly its
judgement (while respecting individual ordinal preferences).
The maximization of (3) is limited by tome constraints: first is the requirement that the aggregate
demand for each commodity (including demands by the government, which I neglect) and supply
of each factor be compatible with each other, given the technology available. This can be captured
by the following twin constraint:
d

≦ ,

≦ 0,

Aggregate Demands;

(4)

Production Possibilities;

(5)

Secondly, the government cannot directly choose the allocations x(h), but has instead to rely on
the working of a tax scheme. Hence, it must take into account the choices x(h) individuals will
make, as utility maximizers, in the face of the taxes. This is what makes the problem a second-best
one. To give a manageable form to this condition imposed by the need to decentralize decisions
notice that an optimal consumption plan for an h'-man must maximize his utility over the
consumption plans chosen by people with any other values of h, so that the constrained problem
max

. .

,

∈

can be expressed as the unconstrained one
max

,

.

That is, an h'-man can in principle behave as an h''-man does (in what concerns his tradings with
the market, so that it is not hours worked that count here, but income actually earned, for example),
as long as he also pays the same taxes paid by h''. By definition, the best policy for h' to follow is
to behave as he finally does, as h' himself, so that the last expression reaches a maximum at
h
= h'. This maximization, in the absence of corner-solutions by individuals and of corners of x(h),23
requires that
∙ ′

0. Individual Behaviour

(6)

where x' is the vector of derivatives of x() at h, while
are consumption- partial derivatives of
∙, ∙ . What this equation ultimately imposes is equality of each marginal rate of substitution of
an h-man with the correspond ng partial derivative of θ at the point he chooses, that is, that θ should
be an envelope of the relevant indifference curves at the relevant points.
A third type of constraint that should be introduced (and which would yield ad hoc necessary
conditions holding at points where it becomes binding) is non-negativity of x(h). However, the
qualitative result I wish to concentrate on below applies to cases where this constraint is not binding
and we can therefore ignore it here. The same applies to second order conditions for individual
maximization, which are assumed to be satisfied.
23

I avoid the complication of explicitly allowing for corners of the allocation functions contained in x(h) because it
will be enough for the result in section 5, our main interest here, to have their description where they are smooth,
for the reason that a piecewise smooth function must be smooth over a sufficiently small half-interval near any point.
This is all we need to be able to take limits as → , .
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4.2. The maximum
We wish to find a maximum of (3) subject to the constraints imposed by production limitations
and by the need to decentralize decisions, (4), (5) and (6). We can construct a Lagrangean by
defining a scalar multiplier ° for (5), N scalar multipliers for (4) and a function-multiplier (h)
for (6), as this constraint must hold at each h. Hence our problem is equivalent to the
unconstrained maximization of:

L≡

, , ′ d ,

∙

φ X ,

(7)

where
≡

, ,

≡

,

∙

∙

,

by choice of x(h), X and the multipliers.
An obvious necessary condition is, as one would expect, that
X

(8)

that is, that there should be production efficiency, sustained by equating relative shadow (or
producers’) prices to marginal rates of transformation. That in what concerns the aggregate
variables X. Let us now turn to the disaggregated variables, x(h). Euler's necessary condition for a
maximum of (7) is that
(9)
and since



∙ ′

and
⇒

∙

,

our Euler equation (written in vector form) is



′

(10)

∙

This equation (together with individual behavior (6) and information on the endpoints, to be
discussed presently) in principle described the required pattern of distortions, the taxes. However,
if we were to double all prices, when nothing should in principle change, the values in the left-hand
side of (10) would in fact change, showing an undesirable dependence of the outcome on the
particular choice of the price level. We need a price-invariant version of these equations, where
prices appear as relative prices and marginal utilities as rates of substitution. For this purpose, let
us introduce a slight change in our notation, so as to distinguish a numeraire, the first commodity,
from the remaining ones, which are now denoted by x themselves. Hence, the vector-equation (10)
now represents the Euler equations for commodities, 2 , … , N, while for the numeraire we have
→

,

(11)

where ,
denote
,
(I shall also write ,
for
,
, below).
, , an h-man’s vector of marginal rates of substitution of the numeraire for
Denote by s ≡ s
each commodity, that is:
15
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S≡

(12)

whose partial derivatives
S ≡

S.

(13)

Using (12) and (13), eqs. (10) become
s

′

s

s

s

,

and subtracting (11) multiplied by s from this last expression we get
.

(14)

The left-hand side of eq. (14) gives the distortions that should optimally be imposed on an h-man's
choices between each commodity and the numeraire, for it shows the differences between the
relative prices he faces (to which he equates his marginal rates of substitution s) and the prices he
would face in the absence of intervention by the government. In fact, (s
/ ) is precisely the
vector of marginal taxes levied on the consumption of each commodity in terms of numeraire in
the optimum.
We can notice in passing that if the utility function has additive separability of the form
,

,

where (x1, x2) = x, then an h-man should pay the same marginal taxes on his consumption of each
commodity in the group x2, i.e. no distortion of his choices should be introduced within that group
(for each h). This can be seen taking as our numeraire any one commodity in x2, in which case s
0) for all the other commodities in that group,
has no explicit dependence on h (and hence S
and the distortions in (14) are identically zero.24 In particular, if we interpret the model as referring
to (single-period) income and excise taxes and if there is separability between labour and all other
commodities, then no commodity taxation should be imposed at all. Notice that, since this is true
in the present case where excise taxes are allowed to take any shape, it is of necessity true when
they are restricted to proportionality. Notice too that the result still holds in an intertemporal context
if labour in each period is separable from the other commodities (and abilities remain unchanged
with age in relative terms), so that under these assumptions there should be no interference with
intertemporal decisions either.
We still need to get rid of the multiplier (h) in (14). For this purpose we notice that we still have
one Euler equation available, say (11) (the N – 1 equations (10) were used up in deriving the N –
1 we have in (14), so to speak), which ultimately is a linear differential equation for (h). Solving
it:

24

The result is due (in the form to be given presently) to Atkinson and Stigiitz (1974). Mirrlees (1976) generalized it
by showing that still no distortion should be introduced within the group x2 when only weak separability prevails,
of the form
x , , x .
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1

d ′′

exp

d

.

(15)

The value of the constant (h) as well as the value of (h), are shown below to be zero in most
cases of interest.
Eqs. (6), (14) and (15) form a system of N + 1 differential (and integral) equations in the N + 1
unknown functions x1(h), x(h) and (h). This provides a sufficient description of the optimum once
we know which particular solution to select, which amounts to determining the values of x1, x and
on either end of the distribution, at
, . In calculus of variations problems such as the
present one where the end-values of the independent variable are fixed exogenously (
,
here), the standard transversality conditions take a very simple form: that
(F defined in (7)
should vanish at both ends [see, e.g., Gelfand and Fomin (1963, sec, 1.6)]. That is, we require that
,

0,

(16)

and

(16’)
,

0,

both of which must hold for each commodity, including the numeraire. To conclude from this that
0, all we require is that any marginal utility be non-zero for a bottom (i.e. ) man,
similarly for a top man, that is, that neither of these two types of persons be fully satiated (i.e. with
respect to every commodity and service) in the optimum. This clearly covers most cases of interest
and we may safely conclude that
0.

25

(17)

We lack a similar explicit result for the end-values of x1, x, because all the equations in (16) and
(16'), the transversality conditions, become identities once (17) is introduced. Our information on
how to specify the particular solution we are interested in in terms of x1, x comes from elsewhere:
eqs. (5) and (8) (the production function and production efficiency) determine the aggregate total
supply of each commodity. That is, rather than fixing end values for x1, x, we imagine the netconsumption function θ being placed at different levels for each commodity, until a particular
solution of the system of differential equations (the micro, or allocation side) induces market
clearance for all commodities, that is, yields aggregate demands (4) that solve eqs. (5) and (8), the
supply side.
5. Zero marginal taxes at the endpoints of optimal schedules
Let us collect eqs. (12)-(17) for ready reference:

25

In the income tax cases (when h is the nominal wage rate) this equation always holds [it corresponds to (20) or (26)
∞ , satiation ‘at the top’ may in some
in Mirrlees (1971)]. When the distribution of skills is unbounded, so that h
cases occur (in the sense that the amount of work done may be tending to zero yet income and consumption be
tending to infinite with the wage rate), but (17) can still be deduced as a limit.
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→0

(where μ ≡ μ
;

d

exp

1

→ ,
→ ,

d ;

(18a)

(18b)

is the integral term in (18a)); and
.

(18c)

((a) comes from (14)，（15) and (17)， and (b) is (16) and (16') for the numeraire.)
I make the following assumptions, parts of which were already imposed above:
Assumption 1. ∙, is continuous, monotonic, strictly concave and everywhere differentiable in
x. Besides, u is bounded for 0 ⪡ ⪡ ∞. Some of the conditions in the first part can be relaxed
without harm. The second part refers to the way in which the parameter h enters the utility function,
requiring that the rate of change (with h) of the marginal utilities associated to a fixed bundle of
goods should be bounded. It is only marginally a stronger requirement than one of continuity of
,∙ as a function of h, basically asking that similar people (h-wise) have similar preferences or
abilities (as is the case, e.g. in the income tax formulation).
Assumption 2. The density
does not oscillate infinitely often as h changes. In fact less would
be enough, that f(h) be of bounded variation, but in either case the requirement seems not to impose
any significant restriction.
Assumption 3. The welfare function(al) is utilitarian and its integral over a zero-measure set of
people is zero. The second part excludes the maximin valuation, in particular. ‘Utilitarian’ is taken
in an extended sense, allowing the government to impose transformations on (or to weight
differently) different people’s utilities.
Assumption 4. The allocation vector-function x(h) and the resulting tax schedule θ (i.e.
0 are continuous and smooth. Unlike the preceding assumptions these impose certain conditions
on variables which are endogenous to the problem, but the conditions do not represent any
interesting economic restrictions. In fact they could be substantially relaxed, asking only that they
being smooth
hold in a local way, x(h) being continuous and smooth near enough h and h, and
and
if these are ⪢ 0.
at
We can now state our central result, which extends the familiar zero-marginal- tax property of the
top end of (bounded) income taxes to both ends of any optimal nonlinear tax or tax mix satisfying
certain boundedness conditions:
Theorem 2. Consider an optimal tax regime and assume that assumptions 1-4 hold for . Then
if , 0 ⪡
⪡ ∞, all marginal taxes must be zero at . Similarly for .
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Notice that this result is stated independently for the top and for the bottom of the optimal tax
regime, so that unboundedness of some x's at the top, for instance, does not preclude the result from
holding at the bottom. However, it will often hold at both ends, and in such cases the following is
immediate.
Corollary. If the conditions of theorem 2 are satisfied at both ends of an optimal tax schedule (or
set of schedules), the latter (or each of the latter) cannot he progressive nor regressive throughout.
Before we proceed to prove the theorem, it will be convenient to see why it should hold and when
it would not. Eq. (18a), whose left-hand side gives the marginal tax function for commodity i, can
be written as
/ ,

(19)

Where
is the marginal tax on good i with respect to the numeraire. When we let h tend to h (or
to h) in this equation, the term (
) tends to zero, and there is a prima facie case to expect
to
tend to zero as well. However, there are some reasons why this may not happen, notably : (i) If in
the optimum there is bunching at the bottom of the scale (similarly for the top), so that x(h) is
identical for all h in a certain range [ , ] (with
, i.e. different people receiving equal
baskets of goods at an endpoint of the tax schedule) then, as we move down the scale of h’s, the
bottom of the tax schedule is first met at , not at , and at
the term
does not vanish. That
is, ‘bunching’ at either end of x(h) definitely upsets the result, calling for nonzero endpoint
marginal taxes. The main condition that excludes here the possibility of bunching (other than an
implicit assumption that h is a relevant parameter, so that unless there is a specific external
inducement to the contrary, people with different h's will normally choose different x's) is the
assumption that ⪢ 0, so that consumers are not pressed against their nonnegativity constraints
and choose interior maxima. 26 (ii) In the absence of bunching (and with assumptions 1-4 holding),
the right-hand side of (19) tends to zero as
μ → 0 (and so does the marginal tax ) whenever
the ratio
/ does not diverge dominating
μ . Provided remains bounded, it is shown
below that divergence of
never dominates
μ , so that the theorem holds regardless of the
(direct effect of the) shape of ∙ . On the other hand, if x remains bounded and strictly positive
over all h, we do have boundedness of as required. But if we allow some component s of x( )
or of x(h) to be zero or infinite (still excluding bunching), then may be unbounded and, if it is,
this may make marginal taxes tend to nonzero limits as → , . This is the reason why marginal
taxes do not always tend to zero in the upper tail of the unbounded income cases studied by Mirrlees
(1971), where consumption generally tends to infinity as we move towards the ‘top’
→∞ .
Remark. In many cases the endpoint zero-marginal-tax result still holds even if some xi’s are
actually zero or infinite at either end (illustrations for the bottom end of income taxes are provided
in the closing section), although exceptions may then arise. What we basically exclude, however,
are situations where there is bunching at either end of the tax schedule, as a result of a number of
people having corner solutions for their individual maximization problems.
26

Another, less central kind of bunching at an end-point can arise if is kinked in such a way that a number of
(different) consumers at that endpoint all choose the same point x
⪢ 0 on the kink as an interior maximum. This
is excluded by the last part of assumption 4.
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We can now proceed to the proof of theorem 2.
Proof. It is easily seen that strict concavity and monotonicity of ∙, (in assumption 1) together
imply that (each i) can vanish, if at all, only if, for some ,
∞ or
0 (usually when
itself is infinite if it is a ‘good,’ or zero if it is a ‘bad’), which are excluded from the range of
application of the theorem. Hence we may assume that in fact
0,
0 for all allocations
≡ /
that may actually arise. In the same way it follows that | | ∞, | | ∞. Hence,
has 0 | | ∞ . Boundedness of
(in assumption 1), of
and of
for all relevant
allocations together imply that is also bounded. Given boundedness of , the theorem follows
immediately from (18a), using (18b), if at either end ∙
0. Thus assume
0. If
we now imposed certain conditions on the behaviour of the function ∙ near the endpoints,27 the
theorem would follow immediately from here, by (repeated) use of L'Hôpital's rule. But we can
more generally proceed as follows. Let us concentrate on the bottom end.
Boundedness of
/ implies that as → (and since ≧ ′ ≧ in (18a), this means as (
′ → 0), the exponential in the integrand of (18a) tends to one: exp ∙ → 1, and it certainly
, , it
remains bounded. Now, from continuity of x(h) (near enough ; assumption 4) and of
follows that is a continuous function of h. Hence, by the sign-preserving property of continuous
is either zero or single-signed in ,
/
′ for low enough ε .
functions, 1
Now consider
. Since it does not oscillate infinitely often (assumption 2), there must be a
′′ in which
is monotonic. Further, since
≧ 0, it must be
small enough interval ,
′ , because since it is monotonic
the case that
0 in the whole of the open interval ,
in that interval, it can only be zero at a point if it is zero at all points below that one, which
contradicts our notion of as the infimum of the support of ∙ (the theorem would then apply
to the lowest relevant value of h ).
min ,
, we have that in ,
, the expression 1
/
exp ∙
Hence if we take
is single-signed and bounded and ∙ is positive and attains its maximum at
. Therefore
′ appearing in
the absolute value of the integral in eq. (18a) is not decreased if we replace the
. That is, from (18a) for
,
it by
1

≦

1

d

exp ∙

d ′

′

→ 0 as ε → 0,
from boundedness of

, of

, of

and of exp ∙

It follows that
/ , that is, consumers with
producers - no taxes at the margin.

27

face the same relative prices as

That ∙ has all derivatives up to order k in some open intervals near its endpoints and that its one-sided derivatives
of order k at the endpoints do not vanish, for some k ≧ 1.
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,

Exactly the same proof applies at the top, now working in an interval
is monotonic and 1
/
is single-signed or zero.

in which both

6. Concluding Remarks
(i) The result just derived, being independent of the interpretation one may give to its various
variables (i.e. of what the problem at hand is) stresses a fundamental similarity between different
optimal nonlinear taxation models one may wish to consider. Nonlinear taxes, in the present stage
of organization of modern societies, can include those on income, on wealth, on expenditure or
even on important consumption goods whose retrading amongst consumers can be prevented, such
as energy, perhaps. In all these cases the optimal arrangement makes the highest and the lowest
consumers in the corresponding scale face undistorted shadow prices at the margin, at any rate at
an end of the scale where the conditions of the theorem are satisfied. I expect similar results to hold
in contexts other than taxation, such as optimal payment schemes or pricing policies, or other
problems where incentives are central to the analysis and nonlinear policies can be pursued.
There is no doubt that some interesting examples are left out by the requirement that no
consumption be zero or infinite at the ends of the scale. In these cases the result does not generally
apply, although it may still explain the qualitative shape of optimal taxes mentioned in the
introduction (typically progressive near the bottom and regressive towards the top). On the other
hand, it is clear that, in general, the consumption of some goods (or supply of bads) being zero at
either end of an optimal arrangement does not impede optimal marginal taxes from being zero there:
it only opens the door to exceptions. One can in such cases proceed taxonomically, specifying the
structure of the problem at hand and, for this, seeking conditions for which the result still holds and
perhaps others for which it necessarily does not. For the income tax problem, for example, the
marginal tax rate is in many eases still zero at the bottom, even if we have people with zero skill
and hence zero income, as Song as we do not make able people earn no income through our
assumptions on preferences (of the ‘bunching’ type of fig. 4). A heuristic argument can be provided
for the easy case when 0
0, for then (18a) behaves like:
1

(20)

where w has replaced h and the index i denotes income (i.e. work done in efficiency units, whose
price per unit, , is the basic wage rate, of section 2), with consumption being taken as good 1,
the numeraire. Then, since consumption by a bottom man is positive in the optimum, , is bounded,
→ 0 as → 0.
and therefore the condition for the marginal tax to be zero at the bottom is that
This condition can be checked for particular cases. For example, it holds when utilities are additive
separable in consumption c and hours worked l and the subutility of the latter is of the form
1

1

/

or

v 1

+l,

(21)

which are just two cases that satisfy ′ 0
0 and therefore also / → 0 as → 0 (the ‘no
’
bunching condition on preferences), while at the same time the indifference curves they yield have
0 the result may be upset, the outcome
the normal shape otherwise. 28 Of course if 0
depending on the speed with which
tends to zero as → 0. However, writing for the
28

To verify that in these case
→ 0 as → 0, we write
, ≡ /
, / , hence ≡ /
/ ,
which by differentiation (using
/ ) yields the following formula, general for the income tax case
1
, where
≡ d /d / . We then calculate this expression for the examples given and let → 0. In
both cases we find that
→ 1 and → 0 as → 0 for each w and hence as → 0 (using → 0 ⇒
0, see
footnote 18).
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lowest wage rate in the economy, it is worth nothing that the result holds when
0 (with any
≧ 0) and that it seems normally also to hold when
0 if 0
0. Thus the occurrence
0 and 0
0, which is more likely to upset the result, seems to be the exception,
that
perhaps more a feature of models we use than of actual economies. By and large, it transpires that
the shape of the distribution of wages does not impose important qualifications on our result as
applied to the bottom of optimal income taxes. The main source of potential limitations to the result
in given cases seems to me to be the nature of preferences near the bottom: whether they give rise
or not to an amount of bunching. Because, as was pointed out above, if some people with different
wage rates all select the same point at the bottom of the scale, the relevant value of w in
determining the marginal tax at that point is some w0, the largest w amongst nonworkers, at which
value the integral in (18a) (and hence the marginal tax) does not vanish. Notice, however, that in
such cases, other things being equal, the value of this integral will be smaller and the zero-marginaltax result more nearly met the smaller the proportion of people who remain idle in the optimum.
(ii) It is tempting to look for an intuitive explanation of the result in its general form. For this
purpose, let us refer to the famous trade-off between efficiency and equality. The former, we know
from basic Welfare Economics, requires that all consumers face the same prices, which must be
the same as for producers. If it were possible to have the correct set of lump-sum transfers, one
could first achieve ‘equality’ (the desired distribution of property, given the existing distribution
of wages) and then allow full efficiency to take place by following the equal prices rule. But in the
absence of lump-sum transfers we must be prepared to part with some efficiency for the sake of
enforcing net transfers from rich to poor through the tax system. Now, when we change a marginal
tax at a given point, it is not the person previously choosing that point who is primarily affected
but, prima facie, all those above that person, for whom the whole tax schedule is raised or lowered.
Hence, the smaller the number of people there are above a person in the scale, the weaker the
distributive (or revenue) implications of the marginal tax imposed on him and the lesser the case
to introduce a distortion there. In the limit, i.e. at the top, only efficiency arguments prevail and a
zero marginal tax is called for. But a little thought shows that this reasoning in fact applies to both
ends of the schedule, because an increase (say) of the marginal tax at any given point is as much a
means of raising the tax schedule from that point upwards, thus exacting some more revenue from
all higher incomes, as it is a means to lower the tax schedule from that point downwards, thus
effecting a certain transfer per head to all lower incomes (precisely financed, given a revenue
constraint, from the increased tax payments from all incomes in the upper portion). This is
illustrated in fig. 6 by the tax function and its modified form . But now, just as equality
considerations vanish when the top is reached because there are no further incomes to be taxed,
they also vanish at the bottom because there are no possible beneficiaries of the tax change further
down the scale, so that a change of the bottom marginal tax rate affects nothing but efficiency
(incentives), which should therefore be given all the weight.29

29

If, however, we attach a strictly positive (i.e. of positive measure) welfare value to the utilities of people at the very
endpoint of the tax schedule, as is the case if there is bunching at the bottom or, indeed, under maximin, then the
above argument does not apply (the equality gain from the tax change does not vanish as we approach the bottom
of the schedule) and a positive endpoint marginal tax is called for on distributional grounds, so as to ‘lift’ the level
of basic consumption for any given shape of the rest of the schedule.
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This argument has for verbal convenience been put in terms of an income tax, but in fact it applies
to the general case, for allocative efficiency in the choices of each person always requires shadowprice pricing, and if we want to impose any other set of price on an h-man (i.e. nonzero marginal
taxes in some of his tradings with the market), it must only be because we expect in that way to
achieve some redistribution in a certain desired direction, such as from rich to poor (which is the
usual case, with h in the model being the wage rate) or, perhaps, amongst people with various time

(hence saving) preferences (indexed by h), if the government is not committed to lifetime horizontal
equity but to spot equality and control of the supply of savings, say [Seade (1977)]. But the
important point here is that in any event (apart from the complications mentioned in footnote 29),
the imposition of any set of distortions on an h-man's demands will actually yield positive
redistributive gains only in so far as there are people on either side of this man, amongst which the
redistribution is to take place.
One would like to know how local the endpoint result can be expected to be, in general or in
particular cases. In the light of the above interpretation one may conjecture that the marginal tax
at a given point of the income scale, for example, should be lower on efficiency grounds the more
people there are at that point, for that means the distortion effect is augmented by the larger base
on which it is being applied, and that it should be higher on distributional grounds the more people
there are beyond that point towards either end of the tax schedule. Hence how well the endpoint
result approximates the taxes required at other levels of income seems largely to depend on how
rapidly the density • falls down towards zero near its ends (or whether it does). Given the shape
of income distributions usually encountered in practice (and if the underlying distribution of wages
has a similar shape), this would suggest fairly low marginal taxes along a certain range of low
incomes, which is in fact a feature of most current tax schedules, having a certain level of income
tax exemption. According to this, and contrary to the standard proposal, negative income taxes
should basically amount (qualitatively speaking) to the replacement of current unemployment
benefits by a fixed income subsidy, not to be coupled with an increase of the marginal taxes levied
on the working poor (although revenue considerations of course require more taxes to be levied
elsewhere, perhaps including a reduction in the exemption level). On the other hand, I would expect
the zero marginal income tax at the top of the scale to be a relatively poor approximation to the
way high incomes, on the whole, ought to be taxed. At each point of the long and thin upper tail of
income (other than near the very top) few people will be facing the distortion imposed by a positive
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marginal tax, while thereby a substantial revenue (useful as such or for redistribution) will be levied
from all those with incomes above that level.30
Appendix (to section 2)
The purpose of this appendix is to derive the differential equation defining the family of Paretoimproved tax schedules of section 2.2. I assume: (i) that we already know or have estimates of the
parameters of a unique utility function capturing consumers’ preferences between consumption c
and work done l, (ii) that consumption is noninferior (see footnote 8 ) and, for simplicity, (iii) that
there is a constant basic wage rate (constant returns), and (iv) that is smooth and has no bunching
at the bottom.
The marginal rate of substitution of c for j is given by
≡

,

, ,

(A.1)

and by construction of , i.e., of
′≡

, at each point (c, y) on

d
d

, ,

we want

.

(A.2)

The problem is to find the relevant value of w to be used in (A.2). This must correspond to the
wage rate of a man who, under , consumes a pair
,
which lies on the same 45° line as (c,
y). That is,
c – y = c0 – y0
= θ(y0) - y0
≡ ξ(y0 ).
, i.e. that ξ

Assume ′ 1 at
,
then invert this function:

≡

(A.3)

0 for all

in the relevant domain of

,

∙ . We can

(A.4)

,
on θ that corresponds to each point (c, y) on .
≡
,
which determines the pair
But on θ we must also have the tangency condition for each w (given smoothness of θ):
,

,

,

(A.5)

which, by noninferiority of consumption, can be inverted for w:
(A.6)
using c° = 0(y°)
Substitution of (A.4) into (A.6) and of this in (A.2) finally yields the desired
d
d
30

0

, ,

≡

,

.

(A.7)

Mirrlees’ (1971) asymptotic results seem to support (and can be explained by) this conjecture: he found rather high
asymptotic marginal taxes (about 30-60%) for the think and slowly falling Paretian upper tail, in contrast with fairly
low marginal taxes at high incomes (15-20%, asymptotically zero) for the more rapidly falling lognormal (both for
elasticities of substitution between consumption and leisure not greater than one).
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Let us now consider more explicitly the problem of uniqueness. If the function g(c, y) is defined
and continuous and has a bounded derivative with respect to c at (and in a neighbourhood of) a
given point , , then an existence and uniqueness theorem for differential equations shows that
one and only one integral curve for (A.7) passes through , [see, e.g., Sánchez (1968, p. 124)].
Assuming away uninteresting difficulties that might arise from the relation between w and y0 on θ
(we basically exclude the possibility that θ is such that no one chooses to earn income in an interior
′ is
range of y0’s), the conditions of the uniqueness theorem are met if and only if ′ ≡
bounded, which is to say if ′does not vanish, the positive-marginal-tax condition. Since θ is a
particular solution for (A.7), it follows that any other solution which starts above θ at the top, such
as in fig. 2, stays strictly above θ everywhere, so that the Pareto improvement is to the strict
1, at that point is unbounded and the uniqueness
benefit of all w. But if at some point θ has
theorem does not hold there. The highest such point is a singularity at which θ and every merge
together, remaining, by construction, the same from that point downwards.
The problem of selecting a starting point for , finally, amounts to finding the uppermost (and in
fact best) allowable such point, a*. This is easily done using the equation for the top man’s 45° line
(we have its slope, 1, and a point, a), which is tangent to an indifference curve of his at a*.
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